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Getting it Straight: The Supreme Court Expands
Title VII to Protect Against All Forms of Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment
"[l]t is evident that anyone sexually harassed can pursue a claim under
Title VII, no matter what; her gender or that of her harasser."'
Whether it was the -nationally televised Senate hearings of
Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill,2 the scandal involving Bob
Packwood 3 or most recently, the sexual harassment lawsuit
commenced by Paula Jones against President Clinton,4 the 1990's
brought a heightened awareness of sexual harassment to the American
public. 5 These three claims of sexual harassment involved members of
the opposite sex-the more traditional form of sexual harassment. 6
Sexual harassment may also involve parties of the same-sex. 7
Same-sex sexual harassment claims have been springing up all over

Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1997).
2 See

Jehan A. Abdel-Gawad, Note, Kiddie Sex: How Title IX Could Level the

Playing Field Without Leveling the Playground, 39 ARiZ. L. REv. 727, 729 (1997)
(discussing how the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings made the public aware of the
issue of sexual harassment).
3See id. Over 20 women claimed Senator Packwood harassed them. Id.
4 Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd & rev'd in
part,
72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
5 See Michael Delikat & Martin L. Schmelkin, Special Litigation Issues in
Sexual Harassment Cases: An Employer's Perspective, 567 PLi/LIT 229, 231 (1997)
(noting the dramatic increase in sexual harassment claims). "In 1996, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission received 15,342 new charges of sexual
harassment, up from 6,127 in 1990." Id.
6See David E. Rovella, Same-Sex HarassmentSuits on Rise: 8th Circuit Title
VII Ruling in Man-vs.-Man Case Spawns a Lower-Court Following, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 10,
1997, at Al (explaining that sexual harassment claims typically involve women
complaining of the hostile environments created by men); see also John Cloud, Harassed
or Hazed? Why the Supreme Court Ruled that Men Can Sue Men for Sex Harassment,
TrME, Mar. 16, 1998, at 55 (indicating that approximately 9 out of 10 sexual harassment
actions are commenced by women).
7 Wright v. Youth Methodist Services, Inc., 511 F. Supp 307, 310 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (recognizing that a male employee had a right to recover under Title VII because
his employment had been terminated due to the fact that he refused the sexual advances of
his male supervisor).
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the nation.8 The influx of claims has caused a legal dilemma, where
courts are split as to whether same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.' 0
During the October 1997 term, the Supreme Court. heard oral
arguments in the case of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
and determined that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII.'
This note will examine the issues and conflicts that surround
sexual harassment. Part I discusses the language and history of Title
VII.
Further, Part II defines the different types of sexual
harassment--quid pro quo and hostile work environment-and the
factors needed to establish a prima facie case. Part III analyzes the
split in the federal courts, concerning same-sex sexual harassment as a
form of discrimination under Title VI. Additionally, Part IV provides
an overview of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
See Kara L. Gross, Note, Toward Gender Equality and Understanding:
Recognizing that Same-Sex Sexual Harassmentis Sex Discrimination,62 BRoOK. L. REV.
1165, 1212 (1996) (explaining that due to the growing recognition of sexual harassment
claims, the number of same-sex sexual harassment claims has greatly increased).
"Approximately five percent of harassment cases fall into the same-sex category." Id. at
1215 n.236; see also Mark M. Hager, Same-Sex Exposes Title VII Weakness, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997, at S38 (noting that since the 1991 Amendments of Title VII, which
allow for punitive and compensatory damages for harassment in the workplace, there has
been a sharp rise in same-sex sexual harassment claims).
9 See Rebecca E. Boswell, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment and Title VII, 20
AM. J. TRIAL ADvOC. 663, 664 (1997).
'0 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer I. to fail or refuse- to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
2. to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.
Id
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S. Ct; 998
(1998).
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involvement and view of same-sex sexual harassment. Finally, Part V
focuses on the recent Supreme Court decision of Oncale v. Sundowner

and discusses the Court's rationale in holding that all forms of samesex sexual harassment are actionable under Title VII.
I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is "an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' 12 Although Title VII
was originally enacted to prevent racial discrimination of AfricanAmerican employees, 13 Congress drafted a very broad, language
neutral statute preventing discrimination of many protected classes.' 45
One of the protected classes Congress chose to include was "sex."'
The category of "sex" was included in an amendment only one day
before Title VII was approved by Congress.' 6 The word "sex" was
added to the amendment by Congressman Howard Smith in an
attempt to subvert the bill. 7 The attempt, however, was unsuccessful
2 42 U:S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (1994).
13See 110 CONG. REC. H2581 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964) (statement of Rep.
Green). Congresswoman Green stated "[w]hether we want to admit it or not, the main
purpose of this legislation today is to try to help end the discrimination that has been
practiced against Negroes."
Id. See also Deborah N. McFarland, Beyond Sex
Discrimination:A Proposalfor FederalSexual HarassmentLegislation, 65 "FORDHAM L.
REv, 493, 497 (1996) (explaining that the main purpose of Title VII was to eliminate
racial discrimination in the workplace); Gross, supra note 8, at 1172 (arguing the purpose
of Title VII was to prohibit the discrimination of African-Americans in employment
practices).
1442 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (1994) (including "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin" within the scope of the statue).
15See Gross, supra note 8, at 1173 (discussing that the inclusion of the word
"sex" as a protected group was intended to protect women from discriminatory practices
in the workplace).
16See 110 CONG. REc. H2577-84 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964).
17See Christopher W. Deering, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment:

A Need to Re-Examine the Legal Underpinnings of Title VIs Ban on Discrimination
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because without Iany
debate concerning the added term "sex," Title
8
adopted.
was
VII
Although the language of the Civil Rights Act does not
expressly include sexual harassment as a form of discrimination, the
Supreme Court in 1986 determined that the language of Title VI1
evinces a Congressional intent "to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women" and, therefore, encompasses
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.' 9
II. Two THEORIES OF LIABILITY OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
There are two different types of sexual harassment: quid pro
quo and hostile work environment discrimination. 20 Quid pro quo
sexual harassment involves the exchange of sexual favors for
promotions or other job benefits; whereas, hostile work environment
is a form of1 sexual harassment that creates an abusive work
2
environment.
A. Quid Pro Quo
The form of sexual harassment that most people are familiar
with is quid pro quo. 22 Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when
"Because of' Sex, 27 CuMB. L. REV. 231, 236 (1996) (noting Smith included "sex" in the
amendment in hopes that the bill would not pass); see also Amy Shahan, Note,
Determining Whether Title VII Provides a Cause of Action for Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 507, 510.(1996) (explaining conservatives added the
word "sex" to the bill in an attempt to have it defeated by splitting the liberals' votes).
18See 110 CONG. REC. H2577-84 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964); see also Deering,
supra note 17, at 236 (discussing the failing last minute attempt to prevent the bill from
passing).
19See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding
hostile work environment sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination and,
therefore, is actionable under Title VII).
20 See id. at 64 (noting that sexual harassment is not limited to economic
discrimination but also may include hostile work environment caused by harassing
conduct).
21 Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that sexual
harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII).
22 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (6th ed. 1991) (defining "quid pro quo" as
what for what; something for something).
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an employee or "employer's sexually discriminatory behavior
compels an employee to elect between acceding to sexual demands
and forfeiting job benefits, continued employment or promotion, or
otherwise suffering tangible job detriments." 23 Quid pro 24quo was the
first type of sexual harassment actionable under Title VII.
There are five elements a plaintiff must prove to establish a
prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment: (1) the employee
is part of a special group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwanted
sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was
based on sex; (4) refusal to submit to the sexual advances would alter
or negatively
effect the employee's employment; and (5) employer
25
liability.
The first element requires that the employee is part of a
special group.26 This is the easiest element to satisfy because "sex" is
a protected group; thus, it is only required that the employee be either
male or female.27
The second element requires that the employee be subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment. 28 "Sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature"
,are defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
sexual harassment.29 "The gravaman of any sexual harassment claim
30 the
is that the alleged sexual advances were 3 'unwelcome;'
1
employee must not solicit or incite the behavior.
23Highlander v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that a female employee did not have an actionable claim of sexual harassment
since she failed to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual
harassment).
24 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that a
woman whose job was conditioned upon submission to sexual advances was in fact
discriminated against as a result of sex).
25 Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982)
(establishing the requirements of a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment).
26 Id. at 909.
27 Id. at 903.
28id.
29
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985).
30 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
31Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
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Additionally, the harassment complained of must be based on
sex in order for the third element to be satisfied 2 Discrimination is
based on sex if "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
are not exposed. 33
The fourth element provides that surrendering to the
unwelcome advances is a condition the employee has to meet in order
to receive job benefits. On the other hand, the fourth element may
also be met if the employee's refusal to give in to such advances
results in a job detriment.34
The final element requires the existence of respondeat superior
liability. 35 In a quid pro quo sexual harassment action, an employer is
strictly liable for the conduct of supervisory employees having
plenary authority over hiring, advancement,
dismissal and discipline
36
superior.
respondeat
of
theory
under the
B. Hostile Work Environment
Hostile work environment sexual harassment 37 is much more
difficult to define than quid pro quo.38 It does not involve an economic
threat like quid pro quo; rather, it denies an employee "the right to
work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation,

32 Id.

33 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsberg, J.,
concurring).
34 Henson, 682 F.2d at 909.
35id.
36
1d. at 910.

37 See generally Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)
(establishing hostile work environment harassment as a form of employment
discrimination with regard to race). The court recognized that discrimination in the work
place that is so severe as to destroy the mental stability of minorities falls within the
purview of Title
VII. Id.
38
See Robert L. Levin & Nancy Quentzel, Title VII Decisions Hazy on Same-

Sex Sexual Harassment,CoRP. LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 1996, at 30 (noting that causation is
harder to prove in a hostile work environment claim because conduct complained of may
be viewed as horseplay or joking).
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ridicule, and insult." 39 This type of harassment involves a much wider
range of conduct than may be considered harassment. 40 Subjectivity
plays a very large role in defining hostile work environment, because
4
what one employee may find offensive may not even phase another. '
However, conduct that is merely offensive is not enough to constitute
sexual harassment. Relevant considerations "include the frequency of
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or,a mere offensive utterance; and whether

it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.
In

1986, the

Supreme Court recognized

42

hostile work

environment sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination in
Meritor Savings. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,4 3 stating "[s]exual harassment

which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one
sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace
that racial harassment is to racial equality." 44 The Court, following
45
the guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
held that in order to establish sexual harassment the plaintiff does not
need to prove a loss of an economic or tangible benefit.4 6 Instead, the
plaintiff must establish five elements to prove hostile work
39 Debra L. Raskin, Sexual Harassmentin Employment, SCO8 ALI-ABA 177,
190 (1997); see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (stating that hostile work environment sexual
harassment is40 a form of sexual discrimination as defined under Title VII).
See Editorial, A Workplace Speech Code, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Dec. 22,
1997, at AI4. "Sexual jokes, banter, pictures and innuendo have all been used in lawsuits
to show their employer is liable for creating a workplace in which one sex is made to feel
unwelcome." Id.
41 See Clarence Page, Nerd Protection High Court Clears Air for Experts,
Fogs it upfor Rest of Us, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 10, 1998, at 9A (discussing that
most people determine what reasonable behavior is in terms of their own behavior, and
find that any42behavior which differs from their own as irrational behavior).
See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
4' 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
44 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902
(1982)).
4' The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission consists of five members
who are appointed by the President and given the statutory power to assist in the
enforcement of Title VII and otherwise to assist in the administration of its policies. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1994).
46 Meritor,477 U.S. at 64.
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environment sexual harassment: (1) the employee is a nember of a
protected group;47 (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome
sexual harassment; 48 (3) the harassment was due to the employee's
sex; 49 (4) the harassment complained of affected a "term, condition or
privilege" of employment that was "sufficiently severe •or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victims employment and create an abusive
working environment;" 50 and (5) the employer had actual
or
51
constructive notice of the harassment and failed to prevent it.
Unlike quid pro quo harassment, which pertains to the acts of
a supervisor, hostile work environment harassment can stem from the
acts of co-workers or non-employees. 52 Another difference is that
hostile work environment harassment does not have to result in an
economic loss, yet it must be "severe and pervasive" when affecting
the victims working environment. 53 Most importantly, hostile work
environment sexual harassment does not have to involve sexual
conduct, but may encompass any conduct "directed at the victim
54
because of the victim's gender".
III. CASE HISTORY

A. Sexual Harassmentis Actionable Under Title VII
Courts were reluctant to find sexual harassment as a form of
sex discrimination under Title VII. 55 The landmark case recognizing
47 Henson, 682 F.2d
48

(1985).

at 903.
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68; Henson, 682 F.2d at 903; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)

49 Meritor,477 U.S. at 68; Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
50

Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
"'
52 Id. at 903-05.
See generally id.
53 Henson, 682 F.2d at 904. "Whether sexual harassment at
the workplace is
sufficiently severe and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well being of
employees is a question to be determined with regard to the totality-of the circumstances."
Id.
54 See Deering, supra note 17, at 242 (discussing the differences
between
quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment).
55 See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975)
(finding that two female employees who were subjected to unwelcome physical and
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sexual harassment as sex discrimination under Title VII is Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 56 which involved a female employee
who was harassed by her male supervisor for a number of years. 7 Her
supervisor repeatedly made sexual demands of her until she finally
consented only because she feared she would lose her job.58 The

employee brought an action against her supervisor and employer,
claiming she had "constantly been subjected to sexual harassment" by
her supervisor in violation of Title VII. 59 The Court held that Title
VII prohibits "hostile environment" sex discrimination, 60 stating that
"[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." 6 1 In determining that Title VII
prohibits hostile work environment sexual harassment, the Court
focused on the language of Title VII and found that it not only
prohibits "economic" or "tangible" discrimination, but the "phrase
'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a

congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women' in employment. 6 2 In addition, the
court relied on the guidelines set forth by the Equal Employment

verbal sex advances made by their male supervisor did not have a cognizable claim of sex
discrimination under Title VII); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (noting Title VII was not intended to hold employers liable for the sexual
misconduct of its employees); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp.
553, 556 (D. N.J. 1976) (holding "sexual harassment and sexually motivated assault do
not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.").
56 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
57 Id. at 60. The female employee, Mechelle Vinson alleged that her
supervisor at Meritor Savings Bank, Sidney Taylor, demanded that she have sexual
intercourse with him. Id. In fear of losing her job she eventually agreed. Id. Over
several years Vinson had sexual intercourse with Taylor, during and after business hours,
40 or 50 times. Id. Taylor fondled her in front of other employees and forcibly raped her
on several occasions. Id.
58 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
59 id.

60 Id. at 73.
61id, at 64.
62 Id. (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
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Opportunity Commission, 63 holding that Title VII "affords employees
the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule; and insult." ,4, .
In Meritor, the Court relied on the language of Title VII to
expand the scope of sexual harassment, recognizing not only quid pro
quo sexual harassment but hostile work environment sexual

harassment, stating that sexual harassment "must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the5 victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment."'6
In Harris v. Forklift Systems,66 the Court unanimously

reaffirmed the Meritor decision by holding that hostile work
environment sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. 67 Harris
involved a female manager who was victimized by the male president

of the company for which she worked. 68 During the two-year-sixmonth period that Harris worked at Forklift, the president made sexual

innuendoes toward her and sexist remarks indicating she was
unqualified because she was a woman.69 The Court defined hostile

work environment sexual harassment as discriminatory behavior that
creates an environment that a reasonable person would find abusive
and hostile, and that the victim subjectively perceives as abusive. 70 In
its decision, the Court refined the Meritor standard, holding that the
conduct does not have, to seriously affect the employee's
psychological well-being or lead them to suffer. injury. 71 Rather,
hostile

work

environment

sexual

harassment

may

include

63 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a)(1985).

64 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65,
65Id. at 67 (citing the decision in Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
66 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
67 Id
68 Id. at 19. Hardy, the Forklift's president, told Harris in front of other
employees that she was a "dumb ass woman." Id. "[H]e suggested that the two of them
'go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise."' Id. Hardy asked Harris to retrieve
coins from his pocket. Id. Hardy threw things on the ground, and asked women:to pick
them up. Id. Hardy questioned Harris about promising customers sex. Id
69 id.
70

Id. at 22.
71See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) (requiring that in order for a victim to claim hostile work
environment sexual harassment, her psychological well being had to be seriously
affected).
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discriminatory treatment that alters an employee's job performance,
discourages an employee from continuing his or her employment, or
prevents an employee from moving up in his or,her. career. 7 To
determine whether an environment is hostile or abusive, the Court
adopted a totality of the circumstances test which focuses on "the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance." 7 Harris strengthened and clarified the Meritor
decision, developing an analysis for courts to use in future sexual
harassment cases.74
The Meritor and HarrisCourts both articulate gender-neutral
guidelines in determining sexual harassment as sex discrimination
under Title VII. 75 The Supreme Court determined that opposite-sex
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination because it creates
disparate treatment in the workplace, which is prohibited under Title
VII. Although neither case involved same-sex sexual harassment, the
guidelines set forth also apply to same-sex harassment.7 6
Since the Supreme Court expanded Title VII to include
opposite sex-sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination, the
present question is whether same-sex sexual harassment
is actionable
77
under Title VII. The circuits are divided on this issue.
The Fifth Circuit categorically rejected same-sex sexual
harassment as discrimination prohibited under Title VII. 78 The Fourth
Circuit's determination of whether same-sex sexual harassment is
72 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.

"I d. at 23.
74 See Renee Levay, Employment Law-Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Walden Book Co.: Does/Should Title VII Apply to Same-Gender Sexual
Harassment?, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1601, 1609 (1996) (discussing the importance of the
Harris decision).
75See Shari Goodman-Berry & Pamela A. Gibbs, Same-Sex Harassment:
Creating Conflict and Controversy Under Title VII, 10-JUN NBA NAT'L B.A. MAG. 12
(1996) (although neither Meritor nor Harris involved same-sex harassment claims, the
gender-neutral standards they relied on also apply to same-sex harassment claims).
76 id.

77See infra notes 84-179 and accompanying text.
78See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
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actionable under Title VII hinges on the sexual orientation of the
parties; 79 the courts held that same-sex sexual harassment, as
discriminationwhere one, of the parties is homosexual. The Eleventh
Circuit has held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII when it involves persons of the same sexual orientation, and
suggested that sexual harassment involving two heterosexuals of the
same gender is also actionable.8 0 The Eighth Circuit focused on the
nature of the conduct, rather than the sex of the parties, in holding
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. 8 1 Finally,
the Seventh Circuit, focusing on the broad language of Title VII,
concluded that same-sex sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination, regardless of the sexual orientation of the perpetrator
and the victim. 82 The circuit courts all use different analyses in
determining whether same-sex83 sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII.
B. The Fifth Circuit: Same-Sex Harassmentis not Actionable Under
Title VII
The Fifth Circuit refuses to recognize same-sex sexual
harassment as sexual discrimination under Title VII. 84 The Fifth
Circuit relied on the district court's decision in Goluszek v. Smith,85 .to
determine Title VII does not cover same-sex sexual harassment. 86 In
Goluszek, the plaintiff, a male employee brought suit against his
employer alleging he was a victim of hostile work environment sexual
harassment.87 Goluszek's supervisor and other male employees
verbally harassed Goluszek about his sex life and sexual orientation
79 See infra notes 112-138 and accompanying text.
8o See infra notes 139-148 and accompanying text.
81See infra notes 149-167 and accompanying text.
82 See infra notes 168-179 and accompanying text.
83 See infra notes 84-179 and accompanying text.
84 Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. I1. 1988); Giddens v. Shell
Oil, 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision) full opinion available at 67
Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 576 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993); Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America, 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994); Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118.
85697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Il1. 1988).
86 Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52.
87 Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1453.
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because he was single. 8 This harassment escalated to physical threats
of harm. 89 The court recognized that Goluszek was subject to
pervasive and continuous harassment during his term of employment.
Additionally, the court concluded that if Goluszek were a woman, this
harassment would not have been tolerated by his employer, suggesting
that Goluszek was harassed because of his gender. 90 However, the
court erroneously held that Goluszek was not a victim of same-sex
sexual harassment.
Although the court acknowledged that Goluszek was harassed
91
"because of' his sex, the court ignored Goluszek's prima facie case,
and concluded that Congress never intended to make same-sex sexual
harassment actionable under Title VII. The court's only support for
its reasoning was a law student's Note which addressed opposite-sex
sexual harassment and determined Title VII was enacted to prohibit
discrimination that stems "from an imbalance of power . . .which
92
results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group."
Determining that the only form of sexual harassment that is actionable
under Title VII is one which "fosters a sense of degradation in the
victim by attacking their [sic] sexuality ... the offender is saying by
words or actions that the victim is inferior because of the victim's
sex." 93 Because Goluszek worked 'in a male-dominated environment
he could not have been harassed because he was a member of an
inferior sex.94 Based on this fact, the court held that Goluszek's claim
88Id. at 1454.

His co-workers questioned him about his sex life, "showed

him pictures of nude women, .

.

. accused him of being gay or bisexual, and ...

poked

him in the buttocks with a stick." Id. Goluszek reported the incidences to his supervisor,
but nothing was done to stop this behavior. Id.
89 Id. Employees, while driving jeeps, threatened' to knock Goluszek of his
ladder on numerous occasions. Id.
90 Goluszek, 697 F. Stipp. at 1456.
91 Id.
92 Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (relying on a student note, Sexual
Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REV.
1449, 1451-52 (1984), which suggested under Title VII that sexual harassment is
actionable where there "is the exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual
demands or pressures
on an unwilling but less powerful person").
93
id.

94id.
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of sexual harassment was not actionable under Title VII. 95 The court
argued that its holding "is. consistent with the underlying concerns of
Congress,"9 yet its decision is devoid of any reference to legislative

history or 97the congressional record of Title VII to support its
conclusion.
Similarly, in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America,9 8 the court

held same-sex harassment claims were not cognizable under Title
VII. 99 Garcia filed suit against Elf Atochem North America, Inc.,
Rayford Locke and Jerry Mowell, alleging sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII by a male foreman, who on several occasions
100
physically and verbally harassed him in a suggestive manner.
The Garcia Court relied on the decisions in Giddens v. Shell
OilIl
o and Goluszek v. H.P. Smith'0 2 in determining that a male

supervisor's acts against a male employee "could not in any event
constitute sexual harassment within the purview of Title VII.' ' 3 The
court did not examine the facts of this case to determine if the
harassment was gender based or if it created an environment of gender
inequality. 1 4 Rather, the Fifth-Circuit refused to reexamine the issue
of same-sex sexual harassment, 105 and simply restated the holding of

95Deering, supra note 17, at 251 (stating that the Goluszek Court held that
the plaintiff's claim was not actionable because he worked in a male-dominated
environment).
9 Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
97Goodman-Berry & Gibbs, supra note 75, at 14 (noting that the Goluszek
Court claims that its decision supports the intent of Congress, yet it does not point to any
material to support its conclusion)
98 28 F.3d 446.(5th Cir. 1994).
9Id.at 451-52.
1ooId.at 448. Garcia claimed he was harassed by his male supervisor,
Rayford Locke, who on several occasions grabbed Garcia's crotch area and made
suggestive sexual moves behind him. Id.
101Giddens v. Shell Oil, 12 F.3d at 208. Held that "[h]arassment by a male
supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though
the harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination." Id.
102 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. III. 1988).
103 Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452.
104See Gross, supra note 8, at 1181 (discussing the Garcia Court's holding,
and how the court failed to support its decision).
'05 Garcia,28 F.3d at 451 (deciding in a short paragraph that male-on-male

sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII).
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Giddens that "harassment by. a male supervisor against a male
subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII.' °6
The Fifth Circuit, as evidenced by its reliance on Goluszek and
its holding in Garcia,failed to apply the unambiguous, gender-neutral
language of Title VII which encompasses same-sex harassment as sex
discrimination. 10 7 Moreover, the court ignored the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VII, as discussed in Meritor0 8 and Harris,'0 9
that the congressional intent of Title VII was "to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment."' "10 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
suggested that Title VII is limited to opposite-sex sexual
harassment. 1
C. The FourthCircuit. Same-Sex HarassmentMay Be Actionable
Under Title VII
The Fourth Circuit is not persuaded by the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Garcia, that same-sex sexual harassment can never be

'°Id. at 451.
107

Brief of the Nat'l Empl. Lawyers Ass'n at 3, Oncale v.' Sundowner

Offshore Servs., Inc. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568) [hereinafter Nat'l Empl.
Lawyers Ass'n Brief]. "Title VII was intended to strike at the entire spectrum of
discrimination in the workplace, regardless of whether the alleged lawbreaker is of the
same gender, same race, or same religion as the victim of the discrimination." Id.
'0' Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65 (recognizing that an employee may establish a
violation of Title VII by proving that "such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."). "[When a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex." Id. at 64.
'09 Harris,510 U.S. at 21-22. "Title VII bars conduct that would seriously
affect a reasonable person's psychological well-being." Id.
"10 Meritor,477 U.S. at 64.
111Brief for Petitioner at 15, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 118
S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568) (discussing that under the broad scope and unambiguous
language of Title VII, both men and women can be victims of sexual harassment "because
of" their sex).
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actionable. " 2 Rather, it recognizes that same-sex sexual 1harassment
13
may be actionable under Title VII in certain circumstances.
The Fourth Circuit focuses on the sexual orientation of the
parties when determining whether a same-sex sexual harassment
claim is actionable under Title VII. 14 Accordingly, in McWilliams v.
Fairfax County Board Supervisors,'11 the court held a valid claim for
sexual harassment does not lie under Title VII where both the
1 16
perpetrator and the victim are heterosexuals of the same sex.
McWilliams commenced an action against three male co-workers and
his employer in violation of Title VII, alleging hostile work
environment sexual harassment. 17 McWilliams, who suffers from a
learning disability of which his employer was aware, was teased by
his co-workers about his sex life and fondled by a co-worker while
working. 18 On appeal, instead of determining if McWilliams
established a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual
harassment,1 19 the court determined a claim for hostile work
environment does
not exist when the parties involved are
20
heterosexuals. 1

Focusing on the standard "because of the claimant's sex" the
court determined McWilliams was not harassed "because of' his sex
112Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir.
1996) (concluding that "sexual harassment of a male employee, whether by another male
or by a female, may be actionable under Title VII if the basis for the harassment is
because the employee is a man.").
113/d.

114McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.
1996); Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752 (4th Cir. 1996); Wrightston v. Pizza Hut of America, 99
F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
"' McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1191.
1161d.at 1195.
"' Id.at 1193. McWilliams worked as an auto mechanic for Fairfax County
Equipment Management Transportation Agency. Id. He was tied up and blindfolded
while a co-worker forced his finger into McWilliams' mouth to simulate oral sex. Id. His
co-workers also exposed their genitals, placed a condom in his food, and "placed a
broomstick to McWilliams' anus .....Id.
"1 Id
"9 McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1194-95. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the employers because neither of McWilliams' supervisors had
constructive notice
of the alleged harassment. Id.
"20 Id. at 1195.
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but, perhaps "because of' his "known or believed prudery, or
shyness". 12 1 Although the court recognized that McWilliams was
subjected to "utterly despicable" conduct that adversely °affected his
work performance, it felt Congress did not intend for Title VII to
122
cover heterosexual male-on-male conduct. "

The McWilliams Court refused to acknowledge McWilliams
was harassed "because of' his sex, since neither the victim nor the
harasser was homosexual. 23 However, if this situation involved a man
and a woman or a gay man and a straight man, the victim would have
an actionable claim of sexual harassment under Title VII.' 24 The
court noted that its holding did not "purport to rule out claims of
discrimination by adverse employment decisions ... involving only
same-sex heterosexual actors . . . [or] any form of same-sex
discrimination claim where either victim or oppressor, or both, are
homosexual or bisexual ....
In Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America,126 the court decided the
unanswered issue of McWilliams-whether same-sex discrimination
27

involving one or more homosexuals is actionable under Title VII,

holding that Title VII covers a hostile work environment claim when
the perpetrator of the harassment is homosexual. 28 Wrightson, a

sixteen year old, heterosexual male, alleged he was harassed by his
supervisor, a homosexual male and five of his co-workers who were

also homosexual males.

29

Wrightson and the other heterosexual male

121 Id. at 1195-96.
22

Id. at 1196.

123See Brief of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 19, Oncale v.

Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998)(No. 96-568) (indicating that the
Fourth Circuit has recognized that Title VII is gender neutral, however, it still precludes
same-sex claims unless they involve a homosexual).
124See Shahan, supra note 17, at 516-17 (explaining the reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit is problematic because behavior that constitutes a hostile work
environment will only be actionable if it is based on the victim's sex).
125 McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 n.4.
126 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
127McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 n.5.
128Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143.
29 Id. at 139. Wrightson's supervisor and homosexual co-workers harassed

him on a daily basis by making sexual advances toward him, describing graphic
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employees were verbally and physically harassed in a sexually
explicit manner which created a hostile work environment in violation
of Title VII. 3 °
The court of appeals began by determining that the district
court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs case and holding that same-sex
sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII. 13 1 Erroneously
interpreting Title VII, the district court required that the perpetrator of
the sexual harassment be of a different sex than the victim.'32 In the
alternative, the court of appeals relied on the broad language of Title
VII and found that the "statute obviously places no gender limitation
133
whatsoever on the perpetrator or the target of the harassment."'
Further, the court stated that "an employer of either sex can
discriminate against his or her employees of the same sex because of
their sex, just as he or she may discriminate against employees of the
opposite sex because of their sex."' 34 Ultimately, the court focused on
the sexual orientation of the harasser as the determinative factor in a
same-sex sexual harassment claim. 35 Hence, the court determined
that because the perpetrator was homosexual, Wrightson had a claim
36
under Title VII.1
The Fourth Circuit has erroneously focused on the sexual
orientation of the harasser or the victim in finding whether same-sex
harassment is actionable under Title VII.' 37 The broad language of
Title VII suggests that anyone discriminated against "because of' sex,
homosexual sex to Wrightson, and touching Wrightson in sexually provocative ways. Id.
at 139-40.
30
Id. at 143.
'I,

Id. at 141.

132 Wrightson,

99 F.3d at 141 (noting that the district court relied on the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Garcia in holding sexual harassment is not actionable when the
parties are of the same sex).
at
134' Id.
id.

142.

135 Id. at 143, see also Gross, supra note 8, at 1198 (analyzing the court's
reasoning and finding that it focused on the sexual orientation of the perpetrator in
determining what constitutes sexual harassment).
136 Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143.
137See Goodman-Berry & Gibbs, supra note 75, at 14-15 (suggesting the
McWilliams Court reasoning is misplaced, because proving that the plaintiff is
homosexual is not one of the factors that must be met for a sexual harassment claim to fit
under Title VII).
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has a cognizable claim, regardless of the victim's gender or that of the
harasser. A victim has to show the harassment occurred because of
his sex; the sexual orientation of the perpetrator
is not an element that
38
must be established in a prima facie case.1
D. The Eleventh Circuit-Suggestingall Forms of Same-Sex
Harassmentare Actionable
Following the Fourth Circuit's lead, the Eleventh Circuit
recognized same-sex sexual harassment as sex discrimination under
Title VII. 3 9 In Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assoc.,'140 a male waiter
commenced an action against his homosexual supervisor and
employer, BVP, alleging hostile work environment sexual
harassment 14 1 and quid pro quo sexual harassment. 42 The court relied
on the legislative history of Title VII, absent any evidence suggesting
an intent to "exclude same-sex harassment claims from the purview of
Title VII", 43 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
interpretation of Title VII to determine that same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII.' 4 Unlike, the Fourth
38 See Shahan, supra note 17, at 518 (discussing that a victim of sexual

harassment should not have to prove that his harasser was homosexual in order to have a
cognizable claim under Title VII, rather, the traditional inquiry is whether the victim was
harassed because of his sex-not his sexual orientation).
139 See Fredette v. BVP Mgmt. Assoc., 112 F.3d 1503, 1510 (1997) (holding
that sexual harassment of a male employee by a homosexual male supervisor constitutes
sex discrimination under Title VII).
140 Id.
141Id. at 1504. Fredette's homosexual supervisor, Mr. Sunshine, repeatedly
propositioned Fredette for sexual favors, and when Fredette refused, Mr. Sunshine
"retaliated against Fredette in various work-related ways." Id.
142Id. Mr. Sunshine offered Fredette employment benefits in exchange for
sexual acts. Id.
141Id. at 1505.
144 Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1505. The EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) §
615.2(b)(3) (1987) provides:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the
harasser.
Since sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination, the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a
member or members of one sex differently from members of the
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Circuit, the court insisted that it was not holding that sexual
145
discrimination was actionable based on one's sexual orientation.
The court stated, "we hold today that when a homosexual male
supervisor solicits sexual favors from a male subordinate and
conditions work benefits or detriment on receiving such favors, that
male subordinate46 can state a viable Title VII claim for gender
discrimination."']
The Eleventh Circuit has not had the opportunity to determine
if same-sex sexual harassment between two heterosexuals is
actionable under Title VII. However, because its holding in Fredette
relies heavily on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
interpretation of Title VII, which disregards the sexual preference of
the parties involved, 47 there is an indication that the court would
most likely find same-sex sexual harassment between heterosexual
males actionable. 48
E. The Eighth Circuit: Sexual Orientation is not the Issue
The Eighth Circuit was the first circuit to recognize same-sex
sexual harassment as sex discrimination under Title VII.149 The court
followed Meritor and Harris and concluded that Title VII "strikes at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in order
to provide 'a50workplace free of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult."'

other sex. The victim and the harasser may be of the same sex
where, for instance, the sexual harassment is based on the
victim's sex (not on the victim's sexual preference) and the
harasser does not treat employees of the opposite sex in the same
way.
Id.
45
' Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1510.
1461d. at 1510.
47
1 See EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3)(1987).
148 Id. (inferring from the court's insistence that it was not holding same-sex
harassment actionable under Title VII when a party to the action is a homosexual).
149Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
"5 Id. at 1378.

19991

SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT

343

In Quick v. Donaldson,151 the plaintiff commenced an action
against his co-workers, supervisors and employer, alleging he was a
victim of a hostile work environment sexual harassment in violation
of Title VII. 52 The victim alleged he was verbally' 53 and physically
55
154
harassed, including being "bagged"' on some 100 occasions.'
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment,' 56 relying on the reasoning of Goluszek which determined
that a male cannot allege same-sex sexual harassment occurring in an
environment that is not anti-male. 57 An anti-male environment exists
where males are a disadvantaged or vulnerable group and are not
treated as favorably as the females. 158 Also, the district court found the
behavior complained of was not harassment but "hooliganism" which
is not actionable under Title VII. 59
The Eighth Circuit reversed, rejecting the district court's
reasoning that under Title VII, Quick failed to state a cause of action
because he did not work in an anti-male environment. 60 Rather, the
court stated that "[t]he proper inquiry ... is whether 'members of one

sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions ' of
6
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. "" '
The court held that the district court erred in concluding that Title VII

151Id.

Id. at 1375.
1 Id. Male co-workers falsely labeled him as a homosexual and referred to
152

him as such using negative terms. Id.
154See Pamela L. Hemminger, Selected Discrimination Issues Arising Under
Title VII, Section 1081 and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, 571

PLLILIT 447, 457 (1997). Bagging refers to the physical act of grabbing and squeezing a
man's testicles. Id.; see also Quick, 895 F. Supp. at 1374 (noting that bagging also
involves "hitting another's testicles or upper thigh or snapping someone in the groin
area").
"5 Quick, 90 F.3d at 1374.
156Quick v. Donaldson, 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
157 Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. 111.1988).
' Quick, 90 F.3d at 1375-76 (defining an anti-male environment).
159 Quick, 895 F. Supp. at 1297.
'60 Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379.
161Id. (quoting Ginsburg's concurrence in Harris, 510 U.S. at 25).
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162
protects only those of "disadvantaged or vulnerable groups,"'
because Title VII protects all employees and "prohibits disparate
treatment of an individual, man or woman, based on that person's

sex."

163

The Eighth Circuit relied on the guidelines set forth in
Meritor, 164 and determined that the plaintiff satisfied the elements
65
needed to establish hostile work environment sexual harassment.
Accordingly, it was an error 66for the district court to grant the
defendants summary judgment.1
The Eighth Circuit concluded sexual harassment does not have
to involve conduct of an explicit sexual nature,167but may consist of
"physical aggression, violence, or verbal abuse".
F. The Seventh Circuit
Expanding on the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Seventh
Circuit in Doe v. City of Belleville,168 held that same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII, regardless of the sexual
orientation of the victim or harasser.' 69 The plaintiffs, two
heterosexual sixteen-year-old brothers, commenced an action against
their employer, the City of Belleville, alleging that they were
physically and verbally harassed in violation of Title VII. 70 The
plaintiff referred to as H. Doe received most of the harassment from
162Id.at 1378.
163 id.

164 Gross, supra note 8, at 1192-93 (noting that the plaintiff satisfied the
prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim that was discussed in the Meritor

decision).
165 Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379. Quick is a member of a protected class. Id. at
1377. He was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment. Id. He was harassed "because
of' his sex; this factor was met by showing women were not subject to the acts
complained of. Id. at 1378. The conduct complained of was severe and pervasive. Id.
166Quick, 90 F.3d at 1379.
167Id.

168Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).

169
See Brief of Law Professors at 18, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998)(No. 96-568) (arguing that the Fifth Circuit should follow the
analysis used by the Seventh Circuit and hold that same-sex sexual harassment is

actionable under Title VII when an employee is discriminated against because of his sex).
Belleville, 119 F.3d at 566.
170
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the other heterosexual, male employees and was termed "fag" because
he wore an earring.171 His brother J. Doe was verbally harassed
because of his weight and referred to as "fat boy" by the other
172
employees.
The Belleville Court, rejecting the analysis of Garcia and
Goluszek, relied on "the plain, unambiguous language of the
statute,"' 173 and determined "the words of Title VII suggest that
anyone discriminated against 'because of' such individual's sex may
bring suit, regardless of his gender or that of his harasser."' 174 The
court found that H. Doe was harassed "because of" his gender. 75 It is
clear that he was harassed because he wore an earring which his coworkers felt was feminine, this resulted in repeated inquiries and
suggestions concerning his gender. 76 In dicta, the court noted the
sexual orientation of the parties is not relevant
in determining if a
77
claim for same-sex harassment is actionable.
According to Belleville the harasser does not have to be
sexually attracted to the victim for same-sex sexual harassment to be
actionable under Title VII. 7' The motivation of the harassment is
irrelevant, because Title VII clearly states that sexual harassment
must
79
discrimination.
sex
as
actionable
be
to
sex",
of
be "because

171

id.

172 Id. at 567.

Both brothers were verbally harassed on a daily basis. Id.

Their co-workers suggested that they were going to take H. Doe "out to the woods" and
have their way with him. Id. The verbal abuse escalated to physical harassment when a
co-worker grabbed H. Doe's crotch to determine for himself if he was a male or female.
Id. Before the end of their employment, a firecracker was thrown near H. Doe, where it
exploded. Id. At this point, the Does left their jobs and never returned. Id.
173Belleville, 119 F.3d at 573.
1'4 id. at 573.
17"Id. at 575.
176 id.

177 Id.

17' Belleville, 119 F.3d at 586.
179 Id.

at 587-88 (citing Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F.Supp.

351, 355 (D. Nev. 1996)).

346

N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.

IV. EQUAL

[Vol. XV

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Courts have relied on the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guidelines when determining if the conduct complained
of is actionable as same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII. 8°
The Meritor Court noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guidelines "while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance."' 181 In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission provided guidelines finding sexual harassment in the
workplace as a form of discrimination under Title VII.182 Under the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines sexual
harassment is defined as the following:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual, nature . . . when

(1) submission to such

conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term
or condition of an individual's employment, (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or*
creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working
83
environment.

80 See

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.

' Meritor,477 U.S. at 65 (quoting General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.

125, 141-42 (1976), quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
.82
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).
83
1 id
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Further, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Compliance Manual finds same-sex harassment is covered by Title

VII.184 The manual provides:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex

from the harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form
of sex discrimination, the crucial inquiry is whether
the harasser treats a member or members of one sex

differently from members of the other sex. The victim
and the harasser may be of the same sex where, for
instance, the sexual harassment is based on the
not treat
victim's sex . . . and the harasser does 185
employees of the opposite sex the same way.

V. THE FUTURE OF SAME-SEX HARASSMENT: ONCALE V. SUNDOWNER
OFFSHORESERVICES, INC

On December 3, 1997, the Supreme Court heard arguments on
the issue of whether same-sex sexual harassment falls within the
purview of Title VII in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.' 86 The Supreme Court was asked to determine if same-sex sexual

harassment "ever constitutes discrimination based on sex, and if it
does, under what circumstances."' 87 Oncale alleged violations of Title
88
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1).1
18 The EEOC Compliance Manual "is a reference source for use by the EOS

[Equal Opportunity Specialists] and attorneys to familiarize themselves with the positions
that the Commission and the courts have taken on various issues arising under Title VII..
EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 601.1.
"8EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 615.2 (b)(3).
186See Supreme Court Calendar, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1997, at A8. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. See
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65
U.S.L.W. 3809 (U.S. June 9, 1997) (No. 96-568).
187Mark M. Hager, Same-Sex Exposes Title VII Weakness, LEGAL TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1997, at S38 (discussing the issues raised in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.88that the Supreme Court will address this term).
1

Id.
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This is a case of both
quid pro quo and hostile work environment
89
sexual harassment.
A. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit refused to recognize same-sex harassment as
discrimination under Title VII.' 90 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order granting summary judgment to the defendants,' 9'
stating that it was bound by its decision in Garciav. Elf Atochem and
held Title VII does not recognize same-sex harassment claims. 92 The
Court noted that its analysis had been rejected by many other courts;
however, it applied the reasoning of Garcia, noting that "one panel
may not overrule the decision, right or wrong, of a prior panel in the
absence. of an intervening contrary or
superseding decision by the
19 3
Court en banc or the Supreme Court."'
Joseph Oncale commenced his same-sex sexual harassment
suit against his employer Sundowner and the three male co-workers,
John Lyons, Danny Pipen, and Brandon Johnson, who subjected him
same-sex sexual harassment.' 94 Oncale was employed as a roustabout,
on an all-male oil rigger. 95 The terms of his employment required
him to work seven consecutive days on an all-male oilrig and then
have the next seven days off.196 Oncale was only employed for a few
weeks before the harassment began. 97 His supervisor, John Lyons,
and two other male co-workers began to physically, sexually, and

189 id.
190 See Giddens, 12 F.3d at 208 (holding male-on-male harassment does not

constitute sexual discrimination), see also Garcia, 28 F.3d at 446 (expanding Giddens and
holding same-sex harassment claims are 'never actionable under Title VII).
'9' Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118-19 (relying on the holding in Garcia, "that
harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a claim under
Title VII.").

Id. at 119.
193 Id. (quoting Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir.
192

1995)).

194See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 2.

'9' 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
196See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11I, at 4 n.2.

'9' See Brief for Petitioner, supra note I 11, at 4 n.2.
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psychologically harass Oncale.19 8 The harassment began with sexual

remarks and threats and escalated to physical attacks involving the coworkers' genitals. 199 Oncale reported the acts of his co-workers to his
supervisor, but nothing was done to remedy the situation. 200

As a

result, Oncale "was forced to quit his employment as he feared that
were he to stay he 'would be raped or forced to have sex."' 20' In spite
of the violent and vulgar nature of this abuse, commentators2 02have
characterized it as mere "horseplay" or "locker room behavior".
B. The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of the
Fifth Circuit, and held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable
as sex discrimination under Title VII. 20 3 In a remarkably brief
opinion, Justice Scalia stated that there was "no justification in the
statutory language or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding

198See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11,

at 4 n.2.

Oncale's.supervisor,

John Lyons began to make comments, "You know you got a cute little ass, boy." Oncale
also claims that Lyons told him he was going to "f--- me in my behind." Id. Oncale says
Lyons threatened him with rape again: "If I don't get you now, I'll get you later. I'm
going to get you. You're going to give it to me." Id. Lyons and two other co-workers
took it a step further and began harassing Oncale physically and sexually. Id. Danny
Pipen, another supervisor, and Brandon Johnson restrained Oncale, while Lyons pulled
out his penis and placed it on the back of Oncale's neck. When Oncale asked them to
stop they all laughed. Id. This same act occurred again the next night. Id. The
harassment peaked that night. While Oncale was showering in a private stall, Oncale was
restrained by Pipen to allow Lyons to force a bar of soap into Oncale's anus. Id.
199See Brief for Petitioner, supra note I 1l, at 4 n.2.
200See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 5.
201See Brief for Petitioner, supra note I 11, at 5.
202 See generally William H. Tooher, Era of Whiners, PROVIDENCE J-BULL.,
Dec. 20, 1997, at A13 (finding Joseph Oncale's claim of "harassment" ridiculous). "This
is something that has been going on forever. It's basically harmless fun, and the normal
male learns quickly that if he laughs it off, and gives it back, he will soon be left alone."
Id. But see Canaday Brief, supra note I ll, at 6 (noting that Danny Pipen at his
deposition testified "that the sexual assaults complained of did not constitute 'horseplay'
within the community of offshore laborers.").
203Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S. Ct. 998

(1998).
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same-sex harassment claims from the coverage of Title VII. '' 20 4 The

Court noted that "male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace
was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often go beyond
the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils ....

205

However, the Court warned that "Title VII does not prohibit all verbal
or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at
'discriminat[ion] ...because of... sex."' 20 6 The focus of the inquiry
is "whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms
or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are
not exposed. '' 2° 7

The Court stressed two major points. First, a plaintiff
claiming same-sex harassment must prove the conduct is
discriminatory based on gender. 208 The fact that the discrimination
complained of was sexual in nature does not constitute sexual
harassment, because Title VII clearly indicates that the discrimination
must occur because of one's sex. Further, the Court noted that "it
would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of
one definable group will not discriminate against other members of
that group." 20 9 Moreover, the Court made clear that after this holding,
"nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination
'because of... sex' merely because the plaintiff and defendant ...are

of the same sex.' 210
Second, the victim must prove that the harassment complained
of was severe and pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
204
205

Id. at 1002.
id.

206id.
207
208

Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
Id. Harassment is not automatically discrimination because of its sexual

content. Id.; see also Oral Argument of Nicholas Canaday Il,on behalf of Petitioner in
Oncale v. Sundowner's Offshore Serv., Inc. (No. 96-568) (arguing that "if the harassing
conduct is nonsexual then the plaintiff would have a burden of establishing a disparity of
treatment", but when the conduct is sexual there is a presumption that it is "because of his
sex."). The Court argued that "theoretically [your] burden is the same ... to prove that in
fact these-the individual defendants would not have treated women the same way they
were treating this man." Id.
209 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting Castaneda v. Parfida, 430 U.S.
482, which held that an employer can discriminate against an employee of the same race).
" °ld.at 1001-02.
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work environment.2 11 Title VII "forbids only behavior so objectively
' 2 12
offensive as to alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment.
Conduct "merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations" does not
constitute sexual harassment under Title VII. 2 13 Furthermore, the
Court noted that the social context in which particular actions occur
requires consideration, "workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the
words used or physical acts performed. Common sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries
to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among
members of the same-sex, and conduct which a reasonable 2person
in a
14
plaintiffs position would find severely hostile or abusive.'
The Supreme Court in its decision, rather than focusing on the
issue of same-sex sexual harassment, focused on what types of
conduct constitute discrimination. 21 5 In its opinion, the Court warns
that "male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation" does not
constitute severe or pervasive behavior and, therefore, would not be
actionable as sex discrimination under Title VII. 2 16 The Court's
express approval of such conduct indicates that some sexual
fraternization is permissible
in the workplace, limiting the spectrum of
2 17
actionable conduct.
Accordingly, the Court, in light of Oncale, vacated the
judgment and remanded the case of Doe v. City of Belleville to the
2. Id.at 1003.

212 Id. at 1003 (noting that this is the crucial requirement in determining a
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim).

"[Ordinary socializing in the

workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation..

should not be

mistaken for sexual harassment. Id.
213 Id. at 1002.

214 Id.at 1003. The courts need to use common sense in determining what is
appropriate behavior for different workplace environments. Id.
215

See Jeffrey M. Schlossberg, The Pendulum Swings Back in Sexual

Harassment Cases, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 17, 1998, at I (discussing how the Court's decision

indicates that they are willing to "entertain a wider latitude of behavior in the workplace
than previously permitted").

216 See Oncale, I18 S. Ct. at 1003.
217See Schlossberg, supra note 215, at 1.
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Seventh Circuit.2 18 The circuit court will have to reevaluate the
teenage boys' claim and "use common sense" to determine if it the
acts complained of constitute
sexual harassment or involve mere
2 19
teasing or roughhousing.
•Although the Court cleared-the air a little, in holding same-sex
sexual harassment is sex discrimination under Title VII, the Court
failed to set forth guidelines on how to recognize same-sex
harassment. 22 0 Rather; it merely states that "harassing conduct need
not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex." 221 The Court further notes that the
plaintiff must prove that "the conduct at issue was not merely tinged
with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted
'discrimina[tion] ... because of ... sex."' 222 The Court has left it up
to the lower courts. to use "common sense and the appropriate
sensitivity" to determine what exactly constitutes sexual harassment.
However, under these broad principles, the lower courts will remain in
conflict as to what constitutes sexual harassment under Title VII.223
The Supreme Court remanded Oncale to the district court to
determine if Oncale has established a prima facie case of sexual
harassment. Correctly, applying the five factors that must be met for a
prima facie case for hostile work environment same-sex
harassment, 224 the court should
find that Joseph Oncale's claim is
225
VII.
Title
under
actionable

218
219

See City of Belleville v. Doe, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002,03. The Court stresses that the conduct

complained of must be severe and pervasive, noting that Title VII is not a general civility
code. ld.
220 See Marcia Coyle, Justices Tackle Sex Harassment Four Cases Offer

Chances to Rewrite this Area of Law, NAT'L L. J., Mar. 23, 1998 at Al (discussing the
Court's failure to clear up all the issues surrounding same-sex sexual harassment).
221 Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
222 id.

223See generally Coyle,

supra note 220 (expressing her concern that the more

conservative lower courts will chip away at what appears to be a Supreme Court victory).
224 See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing the elements a
plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual
harassment).
225See Nat'l Empl Lawyers Ass'n. Brief, supra note 107, at 21.
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First, Joseph Oncale is a member of a protected groupto prove because any male or
sex.22 6 This is the easiest part of the test 227
group.
protected
a
of
member
a
female is
Second, Joseph Oncale was subject to unwelcome sexual
harassment. 228 "The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that
the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome'." 229 It cannot be
argued that the acts Oncale was subjected to were not unwelcome; he
informed both his supervisor and his harassers that their actions were
offensive to him. 230 No one welcomes the physical and verbal threats
of rape.
23 1
Third, Oncale received this treatment "because of' his'sex.
As the City of Belleville Court noted when one is sexually assaulted it
is "impossible to de-link the harassment from the gender of the
individual harassed". 232 Moreover, Oncale was a victim of sexual
harassment because of his sex; this conduct would not have occurred
if Oncale were a woman.
Fourth, the harassment Oncale complained: of affected the
terms, conditions and privileges of his employment.23 3 Oncale was
forced to leave his job because he feared the sexual abuse he had been
subject would escalate. 234 Moreover, the defendants' conduct was so
226 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(l) (1994).
227

See. Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545,

1549 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
228 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 11, at 4.
229 Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (quoting 29
.
.''
:
C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a)(1985)).
230 See Nat'l Empl. Lawyers Ass'n Brief, supra note 107, at 9.
231 See Nat'l Empl. Lawyers Ass'n Brief, supra note 107, at 19-20 (noting
that when one intentionally grabs the testicles of another, such conduct is in some way
related to the sex of the individuals).
232 Belleville, 119 F.3d at 580.
233 See 20/20: Man to Man (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 6, 1997)
(interviewing Joseph Oncale about the alleged harassment). Oncale 'indicated he was
affected by the harassment when he said: "Everybody seen what happened to me, you
know, and 'everybody was, talking about it. I felt belittled, like, I was nothing. If I did
anything, I would lose my job, you know." Id.
234 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note I 11, at 5 (noting that Oncale was
. forced to quit his job because he feared he would be raped).
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severe and pervasive that it created an abusive work environment.
Oncale was forcibly sodomized by the defendants, and they threatened
to further abuse him with rape. 235 This conduct is very severe and
would alter the working conditions of any individual.
Finally, Oncale's employer was aware of the conduct. Oncale
complained to the highest man on the ship, but nothing was done to
rectify the situation.236
In light of the Supreme Court's decision and the elements
established in Meritor, Oncale has an actionable claim under Title
VII.
V. CONCLUSION

Twelve years ago the Supreme Court extended Title VII to
include opposite-sex sexual harassment as sex discrimination. 237 The
Supreme Court determined that the language of Title VII "evinces a
congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women' in employment., 238 In Oncale the
Court applied that exact language to determine same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII. This was a tremendous
victory for those victims who were denied a federal remedy for being
harassed in the workplace. However, questions still remain about how
to define same-sex sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination.
The effect of the Supreme Court's failure to issue clear guidelines as
to what constitutes same-sex sexual harassment remains to be unseen.
Unless clear standards are devised in the future the courts will remain
in conflict as to what behavior constitutes sexual harassment.
Denise Merna

235See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 111, at 4 n.2.
236 See Brief for Petitioner, supranote 111, at 4-5.
23 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
23

Id. at 64.

